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On Emotion and Rationality:
a response to Barrett
ELLIS VAN DAM & JAN STEUTEL
Free University, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
ABSTRACT In a recent paper Richard Barrett criticises Solomon (and the so-called cognitivists
in general) for dismissing irrational emotions as marginal and atypical. This paper argues that
Barrett's criticism is unwarranted. Two explanations are suggested for his misconception of
Solomon's view (and, more generally, of the cognitive view) on irrational emotions. First,
Barrett mistakenly conceives the reconciliation of emotion and reason as a conciliation of
emotion and rationality in an evaluative or normative sense. Secondly, Barrett disregards the
difference between the cognitive conception of (ir)rationality and his own definition of
(ir)rationality in terms of coping. Some implications of the argument for the education of
(moral) emotions are spelled out.
Introduction
Not long ago Richard Barrett (1994) wrote an interesting paper in which he
reproaches the philosopher Robert Solomon for dismissing irrational emotions as
marginal or peripheral experiences. Within the framework of his paper, the words
"marginal" and "peripheral" are used in different ways. Barrett says that Solomon
regards irrational emotions not only as atypical and uncommon but also as unim-
portant or insignificant. Against this view Barrett maintains that irrational emotions
occur frequently and play a significant role in our lives.
However, in his well-known book The Passions Solomon deals with irrational
emotions at great length (Solomon, 1977, pp. 375-431); he certainly does not
conceive of these emotions as marginal phenomena. On the contrary, he argues that
irrational emotions are experienced frequently. In his view, the many ways in which
the rationality of emotions can be affected or disrupted are worth a separate study.
Moreover, he argues that irrational emotions are important because they can
endanger central values and interests, such as personal dignity, self-esteem, mutual
respect and intimacy. On account of these undermining effects, irrational emotions
have to be examined and superseded.
In other words, although Barrett's argument is otherwise careful and well-
considered, he seems to misunderstand Solomon's view concerning the place of
irrational emotions in our lives. In this paper we shall try to find out what lines of
reasoning could possibly underlie Barrett's questionable interpretation. First, we will
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396 On Emotion and Rationality
summarise the so-called cognitive conception of emotions—of which Solomon is an
important advocate—as well as Barrett's critical comment on this 'modern' view.
Secondly, we shall try to offer two plausible explanations for the fact that Barrett
mistakenly believes that cognitivists in general, and Solomon in particular, regard
irrational emotions as unimportant or trivial phenomena. In the final section we will
sketch briefly some important (moral) educational implications of our argument.
The Cognitive View and Barrett's Criticism
In the last 20 years or so, the view that emotions have a cognitive core has been
dominant among philosophers. However, this communis opinio does not mean that
controversies concerning the different components of emotions are absent. On the
contrary, the specific nature of the cognitive core is a subject of heated discussion
(cf. Armon-Jones, 1991, pp. 16-26). According to some philosophers, the character-
istic cognitive component of an emotion is truth-asserting. They conceive of such a
cognition as a belief (Taylor, 1985, pp. 1-16) or a judgement (Solomon, 1977, pp.
185-191; 1980, pp. 257-258). For example, a person who is angry at someone
believes or judges that the other person has culpably offended. Other philosophers,
however, prefer a broader explanation of the cognitive component. They acknowl-
edge that experiencing an emotion normally involves conceptualising the situation in
a certain way, but they deny that such a conceptualisation always is accompanied by
a truth commitment. For example, a person who is angry at someone sees or construes
that particular person as having culpably offended, but is not necessarily claiming
that this conceptualisation is true. For that reason these philosophers do not speak
of beliefs or judgements, but prefer expressions such as "appraisals" (Lazarus, 1991,
pp. 39, 127-170), "construals" (Roberts, 1988, pp. 190-192) or "determinate
patterns of salience among objects of attention" (De Sousa, 1980, p. 137; 1987, pp.
40, 107-139).
In his paper Barrett criticises not only Solomon's view but all versions of the
cognitive conception of emotions. His main objection to this conception is that
conflicts between reason and emotion are seriously neglected. With reference to the
"traditional" view, in which the dichotomy between reason and emotion is high-
lighted, he sets himself the task of drawing attention to the disruptive effects of
irrational emotions.
Barrett makes a distinction between two types of irrational emotions: namely,
emotions that hamper proper participation in a civilised or rational discourse, and
emotions that are impediments to the accomplishment of demanding tasks. He
explains the former type by means of an example in which two people are engaging
in a relatively difficult conversation. At some point one of the speakers makes
annoying and irrelevant remarks, as a result of which the level of discourse deterio-
rates. Uttering such remarks, says Barrett, "is an emotional occurrence if it is done
through a felt incapacity to continue talking at the more demanding level" (p. 137).
Of the latter type of irrational emotions, Barrett offers the following example. A
person has bought a harpsichord kit and tries to build the instrument on her own.
This is, without doubt, a long and painstaking task. After a while she becomes
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impatient. Driven by "a felt exasperation with the demands of the job", she throws
some parts across the room and damages other parts with a hammer (p. 137).
According to Barrett, the educational remedy for irrational emotions does not
consist in improving skills of self-control and certainly not in cultivating such
feelings. What should be stimulated is "the development of abilities to cope with
practical and discursive matters, together with a respect for these abilities and for the
disciplined habits that they require and sustain" (pp. 142-143).
Two Possible Explanations
As already stated, Barrett argues that according to the cognitive conception in
general, and the view of Solomon in particular, irrational emotions are marginal
experiences in our lives. We think that Barrett is manifestly wrong on that point. In
this section we shall underpin our criticism by indicating two lines of reasoning in
his paper that could possibly explain his misinterpretation.
A first line of reasoning is presented in particular at page 140 and, in a concise
form, in the last sentence of his abstract. Briefly stated this argument runs as follows.
Cognitivists are of the opinion that emotions have a cognitive core. In view of this
interpretation, cognitivists think that reason and emotion can be reconciled; by
conciliating reason and emotion in this way, there can hardly be any room for
irrational emotions within a cognitive conception.
This argument explains why Barrett thinks that cognitivists regard irrational
emotions as peripheral phenomena. However, in our view this line of reasoning is
defective. Surely, by defining emotion to include a cognitive component, reason and
emotion are reconciled. But Barrett seems to confuse two senses of "rational":
namely, "rational" as opposed to wowrational (or arational) and "rational" as
opposed to irrational. In the former sense the term "rational" is used in a descriptive
or classifying way (just like "moral" versus "nowmoral"). Indeed, within the cogni-
tive view emotions are reconciled with rationality in this particular sense of the word.
Owing to the fact that emotions have a cognitive core, they can be based on good
or bad reasons. And because emotions can be (unjustified they are, so to speak, part
of the domain of reason. In the latter sense, however, the word "rational" is used in
a normative or evaluative way (just like "moral" versus "immoral"). Different from
Barrett's interpretation, in a cognitive conception emotions are not reconciled with
rationality in this sense of the word. On the contrary, the fact that emotions are
rational in a descriptive sense is a precondition for the possibility of irrational
emotions. Only because of the cognitive component can emotions be based on poor
reasons—reasons which may be so poor that they have to be considered irrational.
Pains and itches lack a cognitive core. That is why the question of whether the
stabbing pain in my calf or the tingling itch in my eye is warranted is absurd.
Precisely because such bodily feelings are nonrational, they cannot be irrational. My
feelings of guilt, on the other hand, have a clear cognitive component: normally, the
realization of having done something that is morally wrong. Since for these cogni-
tions reasons can be adduced, feelings of guilt are rational in the descriptive sense
of the word. That explains why such an emotion can also be valued positively as
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rational (in so far as my guilt feelings are justified or based on good reasons) or
evaluated negatively as irrational (if my feelings of guilt are unfounded or make no
sense at all) [1].
In short, Barrett mistakenly believes that cognitivists are reconciling emotion
and rationality in the normative sense, resulting in his reproach that they ignore the
importance of irrational emotions. The fact, however, is that the cognitive view only
implies a conciliation of emotion and rationality in the descriptive sense. Such a
reconciliation is a logical condition for the possibility of irrational emotions and as
such also a prerequisite for placing these emotions at the centre of our existence.
It is possible to discern a second line of reasoning in Barrett's paper which could
account for his (incorrect) view that irrational emotions are played down by
cognitivists. Barrett defines the evaluative pair of concepts "rational-irrational" in
terms of coping. He designates a frame of mind as rational in the normative sense if
it is composed of cognitive attitudes that undergird or support constructive action
and civilised discourse. In his view, emotions or emotional occurrences are all too
often lapses from coping and in this respect irrational. We could call this character-
isation of "rational-irrational" the functional conception. According to this concep-
tion, emotions are irrational if they are dysfunctional: that means, if they incite us to
forms of behaviour that hamper or obstruct effective performance of a difficult task
or appropriate participation in a demanding conversation.
Now the point at issue is that this definition of (irrationality is not the same as
the conception that is at the centre of interest in the cognitive tradition. According
to this conception, emotions have a cognitive core that can be based on reasons.
Answering the question of whether or not an emotion is rational, in the evaluative
meaning of that term, means examining the soundness of those reasons. If the
cognitive component is justified the emotion is rational, whereas an irrational
emotion has a cognitive core that is unjustified. This explanation of "rational-
irrational" could be called the reasons conception [2].
It is important not to confuse the reasons conception of (ir)rational emotions
with the functional conception. In his paper Barrett gives examples of emotions that
he considers to be irrational, such as feelings of exasperation that are expressed in
behaviour which impedes the completion of a long and painstaking task (p. 137) or
feelings of anxiety that hamper effective participation in a rational discourse
(p. 139). Starting from Barrett's conception, these feelings are indeed to be regarded
as irrational because they are incentives to dysfunctional .behaviour. However,
according to the reasons conception of (irrationality such feelings can positively be
rational, in the evaluative sense. Bad luck and setbacks when performing precision
work can offer us good reasons for being irritated. Having feelings of anxiety in
anticipation of bringing our deepest commitments under discussion is surely not
irrational. Rather, it would be irrational not to conceive of such a prospect as
threatening.
In short, Barrett's definition of "(ir)rationality" is essentially different from the
conception that is highlighted by cognitivists. That difference in interpretation could
be a second explanation for the fact that he wrongly believes that cognitivists consign
irrational emotions to the margins of our existence. Indeed, if we depart from
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Barrett's conception of (irrationality, reading publications of cognitivists will proba-
bly give the impression that irrational emotions are regarded as atypical or unimport-
ant. From this, however, we cannot conclude that cognitivists trivialise irrational
emotions as such, for if we start from the dominant cognitivists' conception of
(ir)rationality, we shall find that irrational emotions are not at all considered
peripheral experiences.
Some Implications for (Moral) Education
On the basis of the preceding analysis, we want to make three concluding remarks
on education and (moral) emotions. First, it is important to make sure that the child
develops into a person with rational emotions, in the normative sense that is
highlighted by cognitivists. This task can only be an item on the educational agenda
if the reasons conception of (irrationality has been taken as a starting-point. Within
a purely functional conception such a task cannot be identified. Take, for example,
the felt incapacity to cope with a demanding level of discourse, which is in Barrett's
opinion an irrational emotion. Considered from a functional point of view, this
evaluation is tenable because the feeling at issue incites to behaviour that can
hamper the continuation of sophisticated conversation. What is lacking in Barrett's
paper, however, is a different type of assessment: namely, an evaluation of the
emotion in terms of the reasons conception. Then, too, such an emotion can be
judged as irrational, especially if the felt incapacity is completely unwarranted and
emanates from a serious lack of self-confidence. Another example of an emotional
experience that is irrational in this particular sense is an unjustified feeling of guilt.
Some people suffer from enduring feelings of being morally culpable without there
being any justifying grounds for having such a state of mind. Should not we, as
educators, try to prevent such emotions taking root in the inner life of the child?
Although Barrett does not mention it, a second educational task regarding
emotions fits neatly into the functional view. To illustrate his conception, Barrett
exclusively refers to emotions that are dysfunctional or counterproductive and,
therefore, are considered to be irrational. Obviously, one can also point out emo-
tions that are functional—that is emotions that facilitate constructive action or
support civilised discourse. Think, for example, of the so-called rational passions,
such as a love of truth, a contempt for lying, admiration of theoretical achievements
and respect for considered arguments. These are emotions that, so to speak,
undergird the life of reason, including rational discussions about moral questions. If
we value such practices, fostering or cultivating these emotions should be our
educational aim (cf. Steutel & Spiecker, 1997).
There is still another educational task concerning emotions: stimulating skills
and habits of self-control. Barrett rejects this task as a remedy for emotions that are
irrational from a functional viewpoint (p. 142). However, if these emotions can
motivate to counterproductive behaviour, it is important that children acquire the
equipment to control such affective tendencies. We have argued above that emotions
can be dysfunctional and yet well-justified; that is, they have to be regarded as
rational from the viewpoint of the reasons conception. Even if the first educational
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400 On Emotion and Rationality
task has been performed successfully, stimulating the powers of self-control is still
not superfluous. Emotions that are based on good grounds and are rational feelings
on that account, can conflict per accidens with important values. In order to realise
these values in such situations, we need self-control.
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NOTES
[1] Solomon explicitly refers to this distinction between rationality in the descriptive and the normative
sense: "It is necessary to distinguish two senses of rationality. In the first sense, all emotions are
rational; in the second, only some are" (Solomon, 1977, pp. 246-247).
[2] The distinction between the functional and the reasons conception of rationality is broadly speaking
the same as the distinction between what is sometimes called "strategic" and "cognitive" rationality
(Armon-Jones, 1991, p. 133; cf. De Sousa, 1987, p. 169). According to Armon-Jones, strategic
rationality refers to the utility of an emotion in view of its consequences for the goals and interests
of the subject, whereas the cognitive rationality of an emotion is a function of the cognitions that
enter into its explanation.
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